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Abstract Ride sharing allows to share costs of traveling
by car, e.g., for fuel or highway tolls. Furthermore, it
reduces congestion and emissions by making better use of
vehicle capacities. Ride sharing is hence beneficial for
drivers, riders, as well as society. While the concept has
existed for decades, ubiquity of digital and mobile tech-
nology and user habituation to peer-to-peer services and
electronic markets have resulted in particular growth in
recent years. This paper explores the novel idea of multi-
hop ride sharing and illustrates how information systems
can leverage its potential. Based on empirical ride sharing
data, we provide a quantitative analysis of the structure and
the economics of electronic ride sharing markets. We
explore the potential and competitiveness of multi-hop ride
sharing and analyze its implications for platform operators.
We find that multi-hop ride sharing proves competitive
against other modes of transportation and has the potential
to greatly increase ride availability and city connectedness,
especially under high reliability requirements. To fully
realize this potential, platform operators should implement
multi-hop search, assume active control of pricing and
booking processes, improve coordination of transfers,
enhance data services, and try to expand their market share.
Keywords Multi-hop ride sharing  Sharing economy 
Mobility networks  Platform economics
1 Introduction
Ride sharing, i.e. the joint travel of two or more persons in
a single car, has long been a common way to share the
costs and benefits of private cars (Furuhata et al. 2013).
Today, dedicated platforms allow drivers to post their rides
online. Such information systems have helped to mitigate
many issues which previously limited ride sharing. Trust
among strangers is established through rating and review
systems, meaningful profiles, user verification, and auto-
mated booking and payment processes (Gefen and Straub
2004; Kim et al. 2010; Slee 2013; Teubner et al. 2014).
Online platforms have also dramatically decreased trans-
actional cost for ride listing and search (Beul-Leusmann
et al. 2014). Fueled by these developments, large ride
sharing platforms like RelayRides, BlaBlaCar, or Car-
pooling.com have emerged.
Yet, these platforms have not developed new ride
sharing concepts. The underlying matching process still
resembles a billboard of posted rides waiting for interested
riders. Consequently, despite its obvious advantages (re-
duced cost, congestion, environmental impact), ride shar-
ing remains a somewhat niche transportation option with
limited route choice (mostly connecting larger cities) and
sparse schedules (only few rides per route per day).
However, today’s ubiquitous information systems offer the
possibility to greatly extend ride sharing capabilities
through real-time monitoring and live matching. Such IS
improvements can help to better utilize existing resources.
This is well-aligned with the recent emergence of Green IS
advocating the idea that IS research can and should play a
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more active role in solving problems of ecological and
societal relevance (vom Brocke et al. 2013; Dedrick 2010).
Recognizing that mobility is one of the largest energy-
consuming systems globally and the only sector with
increasing emissions in most countries (Bicocchi and
Mamei 2014), the notion of IS-enhanced ride sharing also
resonates well with the objectives of the Energy Infor-
matics movement (Watson et al. 2010; Goebel et al. 2014).
One apparent option for augmenting ride sharing is to
facilitate chained ride connections with transfers similar to
multi-leg flights or train rides. While this requires robust
multi-party scheduling capabilities, it also promises to
increase ride liquidity as well as destination choice. In this
paper, we explore the benefits and economic implications
of such multi-hop ride sharing (MHRS) systems. To this
end, we rely on empirical ride sharing data to assess MHRS
potentials. Furthermore, we consider economic and trans-
actional challenges, leveraging results from platform eco-
nomics (Rochet and Tirole 2003) and service value
networks (Basole and Rouse 2008; Blau et al. 2009). In
particular, we address the following central research
questions:
1. How competitive and reliable are multi-hop ride
sharing networks?
2. Which operational and strategic challenges does
multi-hop ride sharing pose to platform operators?
By addressing these research questions, our study con-
tributes to the literature on shared and IS-enhanced
mobility systems. We assess properties and potentials of
multi-hop ride sharing systems by leveraging empirical
ride sharing data. This approach allows us to reveal
structural and economic properties of such online mobility
platforms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Sect. 2, we briefly summarize current research on direct
and multi-hop ride sharing. Furthermore, we recapitulate
key insights from platform economics and service value
networks. Based on empirical ride sharing data, we simu-
late multi-hop offerings and evaluate their potentials and
competitiveness in Sect. 3. Section 4 explores challenges
for platform operators with respect to pricing, network
effects, and platform envelopment. Finally, we discuss
practical implications of our findings and indicate paths for
future research in Sect. 5.
2 Related Work
Multi-hop ride sharing touches upon different research
branches. Firstly, shared mobility systems are a central part
of the Sharing Economy which has recently seen great
attention (Botsman and Rogers 2010; Cusumano 2014;
Teubner 2014). Furthermore, ride sharing can be consid-
ered a two-sided market as platform operators cater to two
inter-dependent customer groups – drivers and riders
(Eisenmann et al. 2006). Finally, the process of creating
multi-hop rides resembles concepts from complex service
composition in networked service systems (Basole and
Rouse 2008; Blau et al. 2009). This section serves to
develop these links and provide the theoretic underpinnings
for our subsequent analysis.
2.1 Shared Mobility Systems
Comprehensive overviews on the emergence and devel-
opment of ride sharing are provided by Chan and Shaheen
2012) and Furuhata et al. 2013). Ride sharing is as old as
the car itself and experienced particular attention during the
1970’s energy crisis and World War II, where the U.S.
government encouraged ‘‘[...] four workers to share a ride
in one car to conserve rubber for the war effort’’ (Chan and
Shaheen 2012, p. 5). Teal (1987, p. 203), almost three
decades ago, noted that ride sharing ‘‘occupies a rather
curious status as a commuting mode, for in some ways it is
inferior to both driving alone and public transit riding,
whereas in other respects it is superior to both.’’
Brereton et al. (2009) investigates how ride sharing
participation can be supported, e.g., by high occupancy
vehicle lanes or priority parking. Recent research has also
conceptualized real-time and data-enhanced ride sharing
(Amey et al. 2011; Lequerica et al. 2010; Bicocchi and
Mamei 2014). Such systems rely on mobile and location-
based technology and various trust mechanisms alike –
enhancing ride sharing by reducing transaction costs and
uncertainty (Jones and Leonard 2008; Cohen and Kietz-
mann 2014). These technologies may also facilitate new
business models. Clearly, intra-city transportation has been
heavily impacted already, considering the advent of
chauffeur services like Uber or Lyft (Rayle et al. 2014).
Ride sharing, however, usually covers inter-city connec-
tions: according to Carpooling.com, the average distance of
a shared ride in Europe is 200 km.
The literature on multi-hop ride sharing is still in its
infancy. So far, most articles focus on algorithmic and
computational aspects of determining optimal multi-hop
schedules (e.g., Coltin and Veloso 2013; Herbawi and
Weber 2012; Hou et al. 2012; Drews and Luxen 2013).
However, this stream of research does not appropriately
capture the actual nature of most ride sharing platforms
with decentral matching of supply and demand among
drivers and passengers. Hence, empirical and practical
insights on multi-hop ride sharing remain limited. Our
research complements these contributions by exploring
real-world potentials of implementing MHRS based on
actual market data.
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To better understand the role of ride sharing in today’s
mobility systems, we distinguish the concept from other
forms of shared mobility. We propose a novel framework
(Fig. 1) to help with this challenge. Our framework maps
out the shared mobility ecosystem and how it relates to the
Sharing Economy landscape. We consider the main
dimensions customer role and asset provision. Ride shar-
ing, the focus of the remainder of this article, is the market
reflected by the top-right sector.
Customer Role – For the case that customers have the
car at their (active) disposal, we differentiate between car
sharing and car rental. In traditional car sharing programs
(e.g., Zipcar or Stadtmobil) customers become members
(usually associated with an annual membership charge) and
get access to a fleet of cars. Powered by ubiquity of mobile
IS, free-floating car sharing systems with ad-hoc access
have recently emerged (e.g., Car2Go or DriveNow). These
systems allow car pick up and drop off (almost) anywhere
within downtown areas. Besides car sharing, of course
there is car rental with companies like Hertz, Avis or Sixt.
In recent years, car rental platforms for private vehicles
have emerged, e.g., Getaround, RelayRides or Tamyca
(Shaheen et al. 2012; Bardhi and Eckhardt 2012).
If customers are in the (passive) passenger role, they
may specify the destination individually – as is the case of
chauffeur services such as traditional taxicabs and emerg-
ing on-demand mobility services (e.g., Uber). The route
may, in contrast, also be pre-defined like in the case of
shuttle services or most ride sharing platforms where
drivers determine the ride specifics such as meeting point
and destination beforehand. There is a natural logic to this
supply-driven paradigm: Drivers can typically accommo-
date multiple riders and are hence expected to remain
active in the matching system for a longer period.
Asset Provision – Car sharing programs, car rental, as
well as shuttle and taxi services rely on dedicated resources
which are centrally owned and maintained. Their decentral
counterparts are private vehicles – after all, the average
private car sits idle for 23 h a day (Shaheen et al. 1998).
Such better utilization of available resources is a central
theme behind the recent up-rise of the Sharing Economy
(Sundararajan 2013). Besides the ownership dimension,
asset provision also entails an organizational aspect:
Decentral systems cannot rely on a central dispatcher
matching supply and demand. Rather, there are platforms
serving as intermediaries between drivers and riders. The
attractiveness of such a platform simultaneously hinges on
both the number of active drivers and the number of riders.
Such two-sided structures are a common theme throughout
the Sharing Economy (Malhotra and Van Alstyne 2014).
2.2 Platform Economics and Two-Sided Markets
Eisenmann et al. (2006, p. 92) succinctly note that ‘‘com-
panies in [two-sided markets] make money by linking [...]
different sides of their customer networks.’’ Such markets
are omnipresent and include, among others, credit card
systems (merchants and buyers), video gaming platforms
Fig. 1 Taxonomy of car-based
shared mobility systems
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(game developers and gamers), classifieds (sellers and
buyers) or dating sites (men and women). Evans (2003, p.
43) more precisely defines two-sided markets by means of
the following three criteria: ‘‘at any point in time there are
(a) two distinct groups of customers; (b) the value obtained
by one kind of customers increases with the number of the
other kind of customers; and (c) an intermediary is nec-
essary for internalizing the externalities created by one
group for the other group.’’ For the case of ride sharing, the
distinct customer groups are given by riders and drivers.
Riders benefit from more rides offered by more drivers
whereas drivers can better utilize their vehicle capacity in
the face of many riders. Finally, platforms are required to
enable the decentral coordination of drivers and riders,
including the challenge to overcome problems related to (a
lack of) trust. Consequently, ride sharing can be considered
a two-sided market and platform operators need to inter-
nalize the economics therein.
2.3 Service Networks
Traditional value chains emphasize isolated transactions in
the context of stable business relationships to efficiently
provide standard products. Yet, they are less less suitable to
respond and quickly adapt to dynamic and uncertain cus-
tomer demand. Against this backdrop, (Heck and Vervest
2007, p. 32) characterize Smart Business Networks as a
new, ICT-enabled organization form ‘‘where business is
conducted across a rapidly formed network with anyone,
anywhere, anytime.’’ Such networks can enhance customer
value through rapid adaption as well as provision of
complex and bundled products. This idea is generalized by
the notion of service value networks (SVN) where decen-
tralized service providers act in a networked context. By
combining individual service offers, these networks are
capable of augmenting basic services to complex services
which offer superior value to customers (Blau et al. 2009).
Key obstacles to overcome include interoperability, service
composition, and pricing. Following Basole and Rouse
(2008), value in SVNs is created through B2C and C2C
relationships, and depends on the technological and eco-
nomic context. Leukel et al. (2011) adopt this vision to
characterize supply chain systems as a network of services.
Bohmann et al. (2014 p. 76) reiterate the potentials and
importance of networked service systems. They note that
‘‘by focusing on economic and societal needs, service
systems innovation can improve the impact of research on
business and society, e.g., by improving [...] sustainable
mobility [...].’’Our research explores such a scenario with
drivers, riders, and platform operators advancing singular
trips towards interlinked, complex mobility services:
Where current ride sharing systems consider individual
rides in isolation, multi-hop ride sharing platforms use ICT
systems to create a network of ‘‘ride services.’’ Service
value networks offer a theoretical framework to model
MHRS as a combination of mobility services, provided by
independent individuals, and to consider crucial properties
like compatibility, pricing, revenue sharing, and default
risks. Recombination of individual simple ride services
enables higher transport efficiency through improved dri-
ver-rider mappings and increased mobility options for
riders.
3 Analysis
Our analysis is based on data from the main European ride
sharing company Carpooling.com.1 On all its country-
specific platforms, drivers post ride offers and specify
departure time, meeting point, ride rules (e.g., smoking,
pets or oversize baggage) as well as prices. Ride seekers
send booking requests. The driver may then demand
additional information, or simply confirms or declines the
request. The company charges an 11 % provision on the
ride’s listed price, paid by the driver.
3.1 Data Description
Figure 2 illustrates the platform’s activity on a weekday
and daily basis. Our data sample comprises rides that were
Fig. 2 Carpooling.com –
distribution of rides across
weekdays and hours
1 While writing this paper, Carpooling.com has been taken over by
its France-based competitor BlaBlaCar which, however, does not
reduce the validity of our data, analyses, or conclusions as the market
models of both firms are virtually identical.
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listed for Friday, February, 15th in 2013, two days prior to
that date, connecting the 21 largest German cities (based on
population).2 We chose Friday as it is the most busy ride
sharing day with respect to both the number of rides
offered as well as the total distance covered. In total, there
are 3847 direct rides in our dataset for that particular day
and city-to-city network.
We extracted the following properties for each ride
offer: origin and destination city, date and time of depar-
ture, cost in EUR (as specified by the driver). Distance and
duration of the rides were extracted using Google’s direc-
tions web service.
3.2 Generating 2-Hop Rides
Based on this body of ride offers, we now consider the
generation of 2-hop rides and its potentials. To this end we
present a method to generate tight multi-hop schedules
from a set of direct rides. We generate 2-hop rides as
follows: Assume you wish to travel from origin A to des-
tination B. The number of direct rides from A to B may,
however, be limited so that one cannot find an adequate
ride. Hence, we consider the option to travel from A to X,
and then onward from X to B instead.3 We use the fol-
lowing operations to generate a schedule of feasible 2-hop
rides:
First, a join of the table of direct rides (T) with itself on
T(1).destination == T(2).origin generates all
theoretical 2-hop rides. This data set is instantaneously
reduced by considering only feasible combinations of rides
with respect to time and route constraints. These con-
straints entail that the connecting ride must start after the
feeder ride has ended, including some buffer time ðlb 0Þ
and a limit for waiting time ðlw[ lbÞ. Formally, this yields
t1 þ l1 þ lb t2 t1 þ l1 þ lw where ti denotes the start
time of ride i and li its duration. Also, we assume a limit for
the extra distance travelled along the path A-X-B in com-
parison to the direct distance from A to B
(ðdAX þ dXB ddAB; d[ 1; where d denotes distance and
the parameter d specifies the constraint). In the following,
we assume lb ¼ 15min; lw ¼ 90min; and d ¼ 1:25 for
generating the MHR set.
Note that a specific ride from A to X may facilitate
multiple follow-up rides from X to B within the acceptable
time frame. In order not to overestimate the number of
rides in the MHR set, we eliminate all dominated con-
necting rides in terms of cost and time of departure, where
lower cost and earlier departure time are assumed to be
preferable. Similarly, two or more rides of the first leg may
be covered by the very same ride on the second leg. Again,
this redundancy is reduced by eliminating all dominated
rides. In this case, lower cost and later departure time are
preferable. In doing so, we generate a tight schedule and
avoid inflating the set of MHRs with dominated
alternatives.
3.3 Liquidity Effect
Based on the set of 3847 direct rides and the time and
detour constraints, we generate an additional set of 3594
multi-hop rides. The direct rides alone cover 346 of the 420
edges in the directed ride sharing graph, whereas this value
increases to 396 when including 2-hop rides. Being a
sequence of basic database operations, this approach
should be easy to implement as a search option by any
online ride sharing platform.These results are naturally
influenced by the parameter selection used for MHR set
generation (admissible detour d; minimum buffer lb and
maximum waiting time lw). To assess their influence we
conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to these parame-
ters. While varying a single parameter, the remaining two
are held fixed at their original values. The analysis results
are depicted in Fig. 3.
Interestingly, the results are fairly insensitive with
respect to the transfer time buffer (left panel). With respect
to the maximum waiting time, the number of trips is also
insensitive around our base case lw ¼ 90 minutes (center
panel).4 However, in the interval [20, 40] min, the sensi-
tivity of waiting time is much higher. Finally, the maxi-
mum detour value (default value: d ¼ 1:25) plays a central
role for facilitating additional multi-hop rides (right panel).
Besides providing information on the robustness of our
results, the sensitivity analysis can also be used to assess
the relative importance of different dimensions in MHR
matching. Service providers can leverage these insights to
optimize processes, e.g., synchronize departure times or
suggest routes to drivers.
Of course, a direct ride (if available) will always be
preferred over a 2-hop ride.5 However, the additional
2 These are (in descending order): Berlin (B), Hamburg (HH),
Munich (M), Cologne (K), Frankfurt/Main (F), Stuttgart (S), Du¨ssel-
dorf (D), Dortmund (DO), Essen (E), Bremen (HB), Leipzig (L),
Dresden (DD), Hanover (H), Nuremberg (N), Duisburg (DU),
Bochum (BO), Wuppertal (W), Bonn (BN), Bielefeld (BI), Mannheim
(MA), and Karlsruhe (KA).
3 In this study, we limit the analysis to rides with one transfer (i.e.,
two hops). Drews and Luxen (2013), found negligible improvements
when allowing for more than two hops.
4 This observation can be explained through the temporal trip
distribution as shown in Fig. 2: the morning and evening ride supply
peaks are fairly compact. Hence, given a short first-hop ride, waiting
times above 80 minutes fail to tap into much extra supply, as the peak
has flattened out by then.
5 Based on the edges served by both direct and MHRS rides, MHRS
trips are on average 10 % longer in distance, 17 % more expensive,
and take 40 % more time than their direct counterparts.
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offerings can help mitigate shortage situations (special
events, holidays, late bookings)6, improve schedule density
or serve as backup connections. We subsequently show that
the MHR connections are competitive with other modes of
transportation (bus and train).
3.4 Competitiveness
Given the raw potential of MHRS to create new connec-
tions, it needs to be assessed whether or not these offering
are competitive in comparison to other travel options.
Drawing on price and connection data for trains and inter-
city buses, we compare these three alternatives with respect
to travel time and prices. Figure 4a depicts train-, bus-, and
MHRS city-to-city relations in terms of duration (hours/
100km, x-axis) and price (€/100 km, y-axis). In this nor-
malized time-price space, a given transportation offer for a
relation would be dominated by another offer if it is
(i) cheaper and at least as fast or if it is (ii) faster without
being more expensive – i.e., options positioned to its bot-
tom left. Given the distinct ordering of the three different
options, directly dominated relations can hardly be found.
Effectively, mode choice will depend on customers’ indi-
vidual value of time.
Asserting a constant opportunity cost of travel time ct
transforms the customer mode choice problem into a linear
trade-off between travel time t(mode) and direct monetary
costs cmðmodeÞ: The preferred mode then obtains as the
minimizer of total costs CðmodeÞ ¼ cttðmodeÞþ
cmðmodeÞ:7 Figure 4b plots the share of total relations for
which a given transportation option is preferred for varying
levels of time value: Naturally, rather slow but inexpensive
buses dominate for low values of time (e.g., students),
whereas fast and expensive trains will be chosen for high
values (e.g., business travel). In the intermediate range,
MHRS emerges as the preferred option on most relations.
This illustrates the competitiveness of MHRS.8 Naturally,
this analysis does not account for other choice-relevant
aspects such as reliability or comfort. Still, the results
should be informative with respect to characterizing the
market which may be addressed by MHRS.
3.5 Qualified Network Connectedness
We now extend the comparison of direct and multi-hop
ride sharing to more general network properties. A central
measure in this regard is network connectedness, i.e., the
ratio of existing edges relative to all possible edges in the
network. The mere existence of a single ride on a given
edge, however, may not yet constitute a truly reliable
schedule between two cities. To reflect this notion of
connection reliability (or width of choice), we deliberately
assume a required threshold number of rides between two
cities in order to establish an edge between those two cities.
Let C be the set of cities, s the threshold value for the
required number of rides, and dij the number of actual rides
on the directed edge between cities i and j. We then refer to
qualified network connectedness as cðsÞ: Formally, we





Figure 5 illustrates the ride sharing network for direct
as well as multi-hop rides for selected values of s (4 and
20). Edge thickness indicates the number of listed rides
on that edge. Figure 6 reports qualified network con-
nectedness cðsÞ for both the direct ride sharing network
and the MHRS network. Naturally, the fraction of
Fig. 3 Sensitivity analysis for number of rides, depending on maximal detour, minimal buffer, and maximal waiting time
6 Anecdotal evidence confirms this notion, as Carpooling.com also
retains fully booked rides in its search results, indicating that demand
may surpass supply.
7 The results do not change qualitatively for more complex, e.g., non-
linear, relationships.
8 This analysis is based on train prices discounted by 50 % to reflect
the possibility of obtaining low-cost tickets or other discount
programs (‘‘BahnCard50’’). The analysis favors MHRS even more
when assuming regular train fares.
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connected cities decreases as the threshold s increases.
Introducing MHRS increases average connectedness by
20 to 30 % points across all requirements.9 In relative
terms this represents an increase between 20 % (for very
low threshold values) and more than 100 % (for threshold
values beyond s 7).
In summary, MHRS greatly increases ride availability
and city connectedness. These results are robust to
parameter variation and different reliability requirements.




Fig. 4 Competitiveness of
MHRS against other modes of
transportation. a Duration
(h/100 km) and price
(e/100 km) for train, bus, and
MHRS. Relation values for
‘‘Hanover to Karlsruhe’’ are
highlighted in red. b Proportion
of city-to-city relations, on
which train, bus, and MHRS are
the preferred modes of
transportation (color figure
online)
9 This difference is significant for any conventional threshold. Using
Fisher’s Exact Test with groups ‘‘direct only’’ vs. ‘‘direct ? MHRS’’
and outcomes ‘‘link exists (#rides s) and ‘‘no link (#rides\s),’’ and
for all s 2 f1; 2; . . .; 20g; yields p-values \:0001.
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Fig. 5 Direct and multi-hop ride sharing graphs for different values of s
Fig. 6 Qualified network
connectedness for different s
values
123
318 T. Teubner and C. M. Flath: The Economics of Multi-Hop Ride Sharing, Bus Inf Syst Eng 57(5):311–324 (2015)
4 Strategic Challenges for Platform Operators
As noted above, ride sharing systems constitute two-sided
markets where platforms mediate between drivers and
riders. Eisenmann et al. 2006) put forward three central
business challenges in two-sided markets: getting pricing
decision right, coping with winner-takes-it-all dynamics,
and handling the risk of platform envelopment. We explore
these success factors to analyze platform challenges for
multi-hop ride sharing systems in this Section.
4.1 Pricing in Multi-Hop Ride Sharing Systems
In two-sided markets, there is no unique equilibrium price
determined by the intersection of demand and supply.
Rather, platform operators need to figure out pricing indi-
vidually for both sides of the market. Very often platform
operators will charge only one group of customers
(‘‘money side’’) with the other customer group incurring
minimal or zero costs (‘‘subsidy side’’). Rochet and Tirole
2006) structure payments by considering usage charges and
membership charges. Current ride sharing platforms opt for
free membership on both sides and usage charges only
incurred by the drivers (lump sum or proportional to ride
revenue). From the platform’s perspective riders are hence
the subsidized market side. This does not mean that riders
ride for free (payments to drivers will still apply), but they
are not charged by the platform. This structure allows
platforms to limit the number of individual transactions
when drivers serve multiple riders. At the same time it
leaves pricing decisions for individual rides with the dri-
vers. As we will see, this may be problematic for facili-
tating multi-hop ride sharing.
We now explore pricing strategies for platform oper-
ators. In the absence of multi-hop services on current
platforms, we base this analysis on the price data from
direct ride sharing and discuss its implications for MHRS.
To assess the economics of ride sharing, we use regular
OLS regressions to identify the key determinants of price/
100km and the number of rides on the city-to-city relation
level (n ¼ 346). The following independent variables are
considered: trip distance (in km), square root of trip dis-
tance (in regression Model 2), as well as the geometric
mean (termed ‘‘metropolity’’) of the connected cities.10
The regression results are summarized in Table 1. Addi-





price and liquidity for different metropolity values in
Fig. 7.
With regard to distance, we observe a ‘‘quantity dis-
count:’’ the price per 100 km decreases in trip length.
However, the results from Model 2 indicate that this effect
flattens out eventually.11 The ability to reflect diminishing
quantity discounts greatly increases the explanatory power
with explained variance increasing from 40 to over 67 %.
Operators need to watch out for potentially adverse effects
arising from distance quantity discounts: In orchestrated
ride chains, riders would not qualify for such discounts, as
their trip is composed of multiple shorter rides. This aug-
ments the relative price disadvantage of multi-hop rides
vis-a-vis direct rides. To be competitive not only with other
transportation means but also against direct rides, multi-
hop rides should effectively be offered at a discount. To
achieve this, platform operators need to assume pricing
themselves as drivers do not take into account the context
of their passengers’ journey. Taking pricing responsibility
away from drivers removes the possibility of erratic pricing
and undercutting (similar to Apple’s App Store) and will
help to establish ride prices in an ‘‘objective’’ manner
based on, for instance, distance, availability, type and
comfort level of the car used, or the driver’s experience or
reputation. Active management of booking and payment
processes also allows platform operators to gain direct
access to cash flows and in turn optimize their business
model.
Model 2 also suggests that there is a minimal negative
effect of metropolity on price per 100 km.12 This decrease
is most likely due to higher liquidity on more populous
connection relations.This assertion is confirmed when
analyzing the regressions on ride liquidity (number of
rides): Metropolity is a positive driver on a given con-
nection. Distance, on the other hand, has a maximum at
Table 1 Regression analysis of price/100 km and ride liquidity
€/100 km # rides
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Distance
(km)




Metropolity -0.096 -0.385* 38.254*** 39.279***
Intercept 8.395*** 15.289*** -6.482*** -30.989***
n 346 346 346 346
R2 0.396 0.671 0.611 0.651




where p1 and p2 denote the
population figures (in millions) of city 1 and 2, respectively.
11 Note that 90 % of all relations fall within a range from 80 to
600 km.
12 The price decrease is 38.5 cents per 100 km for a 1 million
increase in the geometric population mean. For the two largest cities
this would suggest a reduction of 95 cents per 100 km compared with
a reduction of 36.5 cents between the two smallest cities.
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about 150 km and reduces the number of rides offered
between cities for larger distances.13 For very small dis-
tances, ride sharing like any other mode of inter-city
transportation is dominated by local public transport.
Going forward, drivers may even be rewarded for
offering rides which facilitate a high number of in- and
outward connections. This will require more sophisticated
pricing routines such as marketplaces (Deakin et al.
2010), complex service auctions (Kleiner et al. 2011;
Blau et al. 2010), or dynamic pricing akin to Uber’s surge
pricing (Gurvich et al. 2014) to be integrated within the
platform. Such changes should incite more drivers to list
their rides in times of high demand. Potentially, some
riders may consider becoming drivers themselves (Zhao
et al. 2014). Stimulating a higher supply by dynamic
pricing can then improve customer experience, increasing
the rate of returning customers and overall (perceived)
service quality.
4.2 Winner-takes-it-all Dynamics
Many two-sided markets are served by a single, dominant
platform (e.g., eBay, Airbnb) whereas in other markets,
multiple competing platforms co-exist (e.g., dating net-
works). The Winner-takes-it-all dynamics hence do not
necessarily apply equally pronounced to all types of two-
sided markets. In this section we analyze these network
dynamics for multi-hop ride sharing. MHRS network
effects may manifest themselves with respect to ride liq-
uidity and qualified network connectedness. Starting off
from our market data set, we assess the extent of concen-
tration benefits by analyzing the effect of varying platform
size on the values of liquidity and qualified network con-
nectedness. Smaller platform sizes are simulated as random
subsets of the complete ride data set. To minimize sam-
pling biases, we repeat this 100 times for each value of
platform size (0 to 100 % in steps of 5 %).
Liquidity Higher levels of liquidity, i.e. a higher number
of available rides, offer more choice to potential ride
sharing users. This typically involves more available start
and end points but also a wider choice of departure times or
meeting points and is thus preferable. Figure 8a shows that
Fig. 7 Illustration of regression
models for generic metropolity
values
13 These findings are in line with standard gravity models as used in
transportation analysis (Erlander and Stewart 1990).
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MHRS liquidity increases much stronger than direct ride
liquidity in platform size. Hence, larger platforms will
benefit more from implementing MHRS than smaller
platforms. Note that the cost of setting up such a system is
most likely independent of the size of the underlying data
base. And even more so, the convex structure accelerates
this effect, stemming from the super-additive process of
ride recombination.
Connectedness Qualified network connectedness is
more specific than mere liquidity and captures the share
of cities in the network connected by a minimum num-
ber ðsÞ of alternative rides. As noted in Sect. 3.5, qual-
ified network connectedness is a key determinant for ride
sharing service quality. This measure provides a clear
quantification of how likely customers are to find suit-
able rides for their demand. As depicted in Fig. 8b,
(a)
(b)
Fig. 8 Ride liquidity and
qualified network connectedness
for varying platform size.
a Ride liquidity, b qualified
network connectedness
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qualified network connectedness is naturally increasing in
platform size. However, given the upper bound of 100
percent, the marginal benefit of platform size is
decreasing and we observe a concave benefit structure.
Consequently, qualified network connectedness is only
weakly increasing in platform size if a critical mass is
reached. In contrast, the impact of additional ride volume
is considerable for small platforms. Again, the transition
from direct rides to MHRS offers great potential in
increasing qualified network connectedness, particular for
moderate values of s:
Multi-homing Another important factor in assessing
whether a single firm dominates or not is the possibility
for customers to be simultaneously active on multiple
platforms. This is referred to as ‘‘multi-homing’’ (Rochet
and Tirole 2003). Most ride sharing platforms do not
charge any membership fees and both advertising and
searching for rides is easy and effortless. So currently,
multi-homing is possible. However, in view of automated
booking processes this becomes an issue. Requests on
different platforms cannot be synchronized and may likely
result in double bookings. Such conflicts are extremely
aggravating for drivers and users and will not increase
perceived quality and trust in ride sharing services as a
whole.
Taken together, MHRS may trigger significant network
effects. With regard to MHRS liquidity, larger platforms
will be more capable of creating a high-volume and in turn
high-quality service. With regard to qualified network
connectedness, ever larger platform sizes will yield limited
additional benefit. Entrants, however, will struggle as they
initially find themselves in a particular steep section of the
curve and are hardly capable to offer reasonable connect-
edness – particularly for higher reliability requirements.
Consequently, top dog platforms could well play out their
competitive advantage and further strengthen their position
by introducing MHRS. Moreover, central booking man-
agement approaches will limit multi-homing and increase
customers’ platform loyalty.
These findings speak in favor of a ‘‘winner takes it all’’
type of market for multi-hop rides (Eisenmann et al. 2006).
We suggest that cooperation or acquisition of competing
platforms could be a worthwhile consequence. In fact, the
European ride sharing market currently experiences a
process of such concentration.14 In the U.S. in contrast,
there still exists a large variety of (local) ride sharing
platforms (Chan and Shaheen 2012). However, extensive
distances between areas may limit the concentration
potentials.
4.3 Platform Envelopment
The business potential of platforms can be severely eroded
or ‘‘hijacked’’ by adjacent platforms catering to similar
customers (Eisenmann et al. 2011a). Consequently, com-
patibility and inter-operability decisions are of strategic
importance (Eisenmann et al. 2011b).
Platforms adjacent to the ride sharing market include
railway and long-distance buses. Given their different
positioning in the price-quality space, the risk of envel-
opment may not be imminent. Still, multi-hop ride sharing
platforms may want to consider establishing interfaces with
other transportation modes. If properly executed, such
multi-modal mobility platforms may emerge as a new
dominant business model. Companies like goeuro.com,
moovel.com, fromAtoB.com, or rome2rio.com have started
into this very direction.
To succeed in establishing such solutions, platform
operators need to incorporate appropriate search function-
ality to enable users to specifically retrieve suitable ride
combinations, possibly routing via cities not taken into
account before. This could be supported by GPS- and live
traffic data. Suppliers of connecting rides may be informed
in case feeding rides are stuck in traffic and – if the delay is
unacceptable for waiting – alternative connecting rides
may be preselected and reserved. For such systems to
function, ride sharing platforms would ideally provide
standard interfaces for other service providers to access
their ride base. However, they will only offer such an API
if the booking process remains in their hands and is not
circumvented. A possible path establish customer loyalty
of both drivers and riders is to offer auxiliary services such
as support for creating more successful ride offers (e.g., by
using profile photos, descriptions, choice of auspicious
stopovers), insurance, or customer loyalty and bonus pro-
grams (e.g., awarding miles). To this end, traditional
mobility operators and other protagonists of the Sharing
Economy like Airbnb may serve as an inspiration (Mal-
hotra and Van Alstyne 2014).
Transaction management, in addition to pricing and
booking, may eventually entail the coordination and
potentially even the maintenance of suitable meeting points
to facilitate MHRS.15 This may even lead to new strategic
partnerships, e.g., with gas station operators.16
14 http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/15/blablacar-acquires-its-biggest-
competitor-carpooling-com-to-dominate-european-market/.
15 Making it from one meeting point to another introduces hassle.
Everyone who ever changed trains from Gare de L’Est to Gare de
Lyon in Paris will certainly agree.
16 These are conveniently located and should be interested in ride
sharing activities for at least two reasons: i) Drivers are likely to fuel
their cars and purchase other products and ii), petrol companies may
improve their image by actively supporting ride sharing – a fuel-
efficient and thus sustainable activity beyond all doubt.
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5 Conclusion
Ride sharing is a sustainable form of transportation.
Information systems have improved its accessibility and
transparency by providing online supply data and facili-
tating access and search. Consequently, it may be about to
leave behind its niche status in low-income and student
milieus. To achieve this, ride sharing platforms need to
embrace new operational paradigms and leverage IS in
more sophisticated ways. In this paper, we have illustrated
that MHRS can greatly increase market liquidity and city
connectedness. The impact on connectedness is particular
pronounced when requiring a high number of daily trips,
i.e. robust schedules. Smaller cities benefit most from
allowing multiple hops, our study, however, is based on the
largest German cities. We hence surmise that our analysis
most likely underestimates the potential of MHRS. Fur-
thermore, we have shown that MHRS represents a highly
competitive mode of inter-city transportation in terms of
time and cost when compared to its most likely alternatives
train and bus.
Our analysis is based on actual market data from a
platform without MHRS capabilities. By doing so, we
contribute to the understanding of ride sharing and MHRS
as much of the previous research on that subject was lim-
ited to modeling and computational aspects. Moreover, we
argue that leveraging IS technology and e-business prac-
tices will help to further grow ride sharing and the novel
concept of MHRS towards a more generally adopted mode
of transportation. In particular, ride sharing platforms may
benefit from the following strategies:
Implementing multi-hop search Given the great potential
of combining direct rides, operators should offer efficient
and simple search procedures for realizing MHRS. To
ensure usability, this function should also provide appeal-
ing and informative schedule visualizations.
Active management of pricing, booking, and payment
processes Platform operators need to assume pricing
themselves to gain access to user cash flows and hence to
establish a profitable provision model. Moreover, this
enables active pricing of MHRS with the perspective of
creating an even more competitive service, potentially even
in comparison to direct rides.
Coordination of transfers Unlike central railway stations
or airports, there is usually no single meeting point for
riders and drivers in a given city. Hence, MHRS-oriented
systems need to encourage the synchronization of transfer
time and location.17
Improvement of data services Current ride sharing IS are
rudimentary. The use of real-time and location-based ser-
vices allows to provide advance information on schedule
updates, delays, or alternative ride opportunities. Also API
provision to third party intermediaries will increase reach,
customer base, and interoperability.
Market share expansion As the two-sided ride sharing
market entails winner-takes-it-all properties, data integra-
tion or acquisition of competing platforms strengthens an
operator’s position.
Information technology is omnipresent in day to day life
and users start to deal with complex services like peer-to-
peermarket platforms in a natural way. Ride sharing can play
a greater role in future mobility systems, as it compares well
against other modes of transportation in terms of cost and
travel time. Going forward, the emergence of self-driving
cars will transform streets into cyber-physical systems and
blur the borders between ‘‘passengers’’ and ‘‘drivers.’’ This
will further reduce the importance of car ownership and
affect every category of car-based mobility (Fig. 1). Infor-
mation systems can thus contribute to build a better world by
creating novel, connected, and shared mobility services.
Multi-hop ride sharing may play a vibrant part therein.
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